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Abstract 
This article examines the SADC constitutional norm on the absolute 
prohibition of unconstitutional takeover of power1 under the light of the 2017 
Zimbabwe correction of governance destiny from a Mugabe contrived family 
dynasty to sovereign control of Zimbabwe’s peoples. The article shows that 
this norm is a blunt tool and its operationalization has enormous potential to 
subjugate SADC populations to totalitarian rule by shielding unpopular and 
illegitimate leaders from popular challenge once they have set their hands on 
the levers of power and integrated themselves into the SADC Assembly of 
Heads of States and Governments – the SADC’s executive decision making 
body. Had it been successfully implemented against Zimbabwe’s Operation 
Restore Legacy (2017) as intended, the norm would have severely restricted 
Zimbabwe’s ancient and enduring constitutional convention of Chimurenga/ 
Inkululekho/ Resistance of oppression, which has the support of UN standards on 
good governance.2 The article recommends the urgent development by the 
SADC of a parallel constitutional normative structure on the absolute sanctity 
of the national assembly ballot to counterbalance the the absolute prohibition 
of unconstitutional takeover of power. The new norm must have also a 
similar if not even stronger monitoring and enforcement mechanism.  
                                                          
* Professor of International Laws, Brunel Law School, Brunel University, London. 
All internet sources last accessed on 08 March 2018. 
1 See generally Muna Ndulo, ‘The Unconstitutional Change of Government’ in The African 
Union: Legal and Institutional Framework – A Manual on the Pan-African Organization (2012) Brill 
pp. 251-74; Ademola Abass, ‘Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa: Rationale, Prospects 
and Challenges’ European Journal of International Law (2013) pp. 933–946; Gerhard Kemp and 
Selemani Kinyunyu, ‘The Crime of Unconstitutional Change of Government (Article 28E)’ in 
Gerhard Welrle and Moritz Vormbaum, The African Criminal Court: A Commentary on the 
Malabo Protocol, Springer (2017) pp.57-50; Ulf Engel and Joao Gomes Porto (eds. 2010) Africa’s 
New Peace and Security Architecture: Promoting Norms, Institutionalizing Solutions, 
Ashgate; Helene Tigroudja, ‘The African Charter on democracy, Elections and Governance’ in 
The African Union: Legal and Institutional Framework – A Manual on the Pan-African 
Organization (2012) Brill pp. 275-90 ; Dersso, S.A. ‘Unconstitutional Changes of Government 
and Unconstitutional Practices in Africa’ World Peace Foundation Paper No.2 (2016) at: 
https://sites.tufts.edu/wpf/files/2017/07/2.-UCG-Dersso-f.pdf 
2 See especially Article 25 of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1966) 999 UNTS 171; 6 ILM 368 (1967) 
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The process to correct Zimbabwe’s governance destiny from a Mugabe 
contrived family dynasty rule to protection of sovereignty of its peoples 
began to unfold when on 6 November 2017 President Mugabe sacked the Vice 
President of Zimbabwe accusing him of disloyalty.3 This was a high 
watermark in the long-running leadership succession struggles within the 
ruling ZANU (PF) Party to replace President Mugabe who had ruled the 
country for 37 years. The move was widely characterised as the last bold 
move to ensure that the President’s wife, Grace Mugabe would be in place to 
succeed her husband as President of Zimbabwe sooner or later. In December 
2014, Grace had been elevated to Head of ZANU (PF) National Women’s 
League,4 a position that catapulted her into the ruling party’s policy-making 
body - the politburo. 
 
The sacking of Vice President Mnangagwa – later annulled by High Court 
Order5 of 24 November 2017 was followed immediately by two 
developments. The first was the swift public endorsement of Grace Mugabe 
as the person most suited to replace sacked Vice-President Mnangagwa by 
several ZANU (PF) organs, including Provincial and National Women’s 
League formations, and Youth League formations. However, it was the 
military’s response that was to shape Zimbabwe’s response to the question 
whether the contrived family dynasty governance of Zimbabwe would 
prevail or not.  
 
                                                          
3 See also Independent, “Robert Mugabe sacks Zimbabwe Vice President Emmerson 
Mnangagwa” 6 November 2017 at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/robert-
mugabe-sacks-vice-president-emmerson-mnangagwa-zimbabwe-a8040341.html . The 
decision was quashed by a decision of Judge President Chiweshe on 24 November 2017 
following an application by Emmerson Munangagwa before his inauguration as President on 
the same day. See also “Court nullifies Mugabe’s dismissal of Mnangagwa” Newsday Website 
 at: https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/11/court-nullifies-mugabes-dismissal-mnangagwa/ 
4 See also Financial Times, “Grace Mugabe named as head of Zanu-PF women’s league” at: 
https://www.ft.com/content/ebbcb6fc-7e35-11e4-87d9-00144feabdc0 
5 Justice Chiwehe ruled that: “The dismissal of the applicant (Mnangagwa) by Robert Gabriel 
Mugabe, the then President of Zimbabwe, from the office of Vice-President of Zimbabwe on 
November 6, 2017 is null and void and accordingly, of no force or effect,” Justice Chiweshe 
ruled in his chambers, hours before Mnangagwa took his oath of office.” iHarare website at: 
https://iharare.com/__trashed-23/ 
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The Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) launched Operation Restore Legacy 
with an address on 13 November 2017, by General Constantino Chiwenga, 
accompanied by around 100 senior military officers6 from the Zimbabwe 
National Army and the Air Force of Zimbabwe, stating that: 
The current purging which is clearly targeting members of the party 
with a liberation background must stop forthwith. The known counter-
revolutionary elements that have fomented the current instability in 
the party must be exposed and fished out. As the party goes for the 
extraordinary congress, members must go with equal opportunity to 
exercise their democratic rights… 
 
The following morning, Military spokesman Major General Sibusiso Moyo 
took to the airwaves to announce that following the previous day’s address by 
General Chiwenga, the situation in the country had moved to “another level”. 
The only clarification offered was that: 
 
Firstly we wish to assure our nation, His Excellency, The President of 
the Republic of Zimbabwe and Commander-in-chief of the Zimbabwe 
Defence Forces, Comrade R. G. Mugabe and his family, are safe and 
sound and their security is guaranteed. We are only targeting criminals 
around him who are committing crimes that are causing social and 
economic suffering in the country in order to bring them to justice. 
As soon as we have accomplished our mission we expect that the 
situation will return to normalcy.7 
 
President Mugabe was placed under house arrest.8 Some members of his 
cabinet allegedly aligned to his wife’s G40 faction in the long-running 
Presidential succession battle within the ruling ZANU (PF) Party were placed 
in custody. The military’s intervention appeared to have consensual support 
of the entire nation which perceived it as a messianic move to stop the 
Mugabes’ attempt to capture and subvert Zimbabwe’s revolutionary legacy 
                                                          
6 See also The Telegraph, “Zimbabwe army chief warns Mugabe's party that military may 
intervene after sackings” at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/11/13/zimbabwe-army-
chief-warns-mugabes-party-military-may-intervene/ 
7 The Guardian, “The situation has moved to another level': Zimbabwe army statement in 
full” at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/15/the-situation-has-moved-to-
another-level-zimbabwe-army-statement-in-full 
8 See also The New York Times, “Zimbabwe’s Military, in Apparent Takeover, Says it has 






that is traceable to the first Matabele rebellion of 1893;9 followed by the First 
Chimurenga (1896-7);10 and later by the Chinhoyi Battle of 1966 or, as it is better 
known - the Second Chimurenga.11 The latter escalated the protracted armed 
struggle for independence until the cease-fire of 1979, followed by granting of 
political independence from Britain the following year.  
 
The legacy invoked under Operation Restore Legacy (2017) was the legacy of 
rejecting and actively resisting oppression – Chumurenga in Shona language 
and Inkululekho in Ndebele language. In this instance that oppression was 
summed up in Mugabe’s attempt to arbitrarily impose a family dynasty 
governance of Zimbabwe. Placards displayed at the demonstrations against 
Mugabe during the operation, particularly on 18 November, left no doubt 
about what Operation Restore Legacy (2017) was all about, namely, the 

















                                                          
9 History today writes that: this was” the first serious fight between blacks and whites in 
Rhodesia”. History today website: http://www.historytoday.com/jv-woolford/matabele-war-
part-i  
10 The First Chimurenga war broke out in the Zimbabwean plateau from 1896 to 1897 between 
the white colonisers and the indigenous Shona and Ndebele communities. “The war was as a 
result of the locals’ resistance to colonisation at the hands of the British.” 
https://www.pindula.co.zw/First_Chimurenga 
11 On 28 April 1966 a group of seven ZANLA fighters infiltrated Zimbabwe from Zambia and 
engaged Rhodesian colonial forces at Chinhoyi. The seven, David Guzuzu, Arthur Maramba, 
Christopher Chatambudza, Simon C Nyandoro, Godfrey Manyerenyere, Godwin Dube and 
Chubby Savanhu  were overcome after running out of ammunition, but not before they had  
downed a Rhodesian helicopter and killed 25 soldiers. It is known today as the Chinhoyi 
Battle. A secondary school built next to the battle scene in 1986 has been appropriately named 




















The SADC leadership responded swiftly and vociferously to Operation 
Restore Legacy (2017) in the name of SADC and Zimbabwean 
constitutionalism. This was not surprising at all. As the brains behind SADC 
constitutionalism from the outset, and also as the longest serving African 
Head of State and Government, Mr. Mugabe had mentored each SADC Head 
of State and Government individually, and also mentored them collectively as 
a group in the Assembly of Heads of States Parties of both the SADC, and the 
AU. In a sense, Operation Restore Legacy (2017) became the unexpected but 
severest test of the SADC leadership’s loyalty to their ‘Master and Mentor’ – 
Mugabe.  
 
In a 2018 interview12 Mugabe boldly stated that his mentees all failed him. He 
singled out South Africa for special criticism because of its military strength in 
comparison to other SADC States. He stated that the South African defence 
and security ministers dispatched on 15 November to Harare by former 
President Zuma “gave a false impression that all was okay [and that] they had 
spoken not just to us but also to the soldiers, and then gave out that there was 
                                                          




no need for intervention”. 13 For this reason, other countries in the region “just 





Zimbabwe is a founding member State party of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) that was established by treaty of 1992.15 
The SADC treaty has a wide range of objectives, including ensuring peace and 
security in the sub-region – Article 5(1)(c). Chapter VIII of the UN Charter is 
the constitutional basis for the involvement of regional organizations and 
agencies in the maintenance of international peace and security.16 
Consequently, Zimbabwe has peace and security obligations under the SADC 
Treaty.  
 
Briefly, Article 52 of the UN Charter provides for the involvement of regional 
arrangements or agencies in the peaceful settlement of disputes. Article 53 
allows regional institutions to take enforcement action, but only with explicit 
authorization of the Security Council. Article 54 requires regional institutions 
or agencies taking peace and security initiatives to inform the Security 
Council of their activities at all times. Thus, as long as it complies with these 
requirements, the SADC remains suited as the first responder to SADC peace 
and security challenges until the AU or the UN Security Council itself 
intervenes. 
  
SADC peace and security initiatives have been developed and codified 
extensively. They encompass on-going inter-State Police and Military training 
for peace and security enforcement operations. The SADC norm on the 
absolute prohibition of unconstitutional takeover of power has been codified 
in various SADC instruments and consolidated under The Strategic Indicative 
Plan for the Organ on Defence, Politics and Security (SIPO)  which was revised at 
Maputo on 5 August 2010.17 SIPO is itself a mechanism for the 
                                                          
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 See the Consolidadted Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, 21 
October 2015, SADC website at: http://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/4171 
16 See also Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, UN website at: 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/regional_arrangements.shtml 
17 See SADC website at: 
http://www.sadc.int/files/6313/6880/3040/03514_SADC_SIPO_English.pdf  
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implementation of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation 
which was revised at Blantyre on 14 August 200118 (Blantyre Protocol).  
 
The Blantyre Protocol seeks to implement the over-arching SADC objectives 
contained in Article 5 of the SADC Treaty (1992).19 The norm is the centre-
piece of the SADC’s peace and security apparatus. However, the UN has 
made human rights protection its core value for promoting and protecting 
international peace and security.20  
 
Thus, the SADC leadership’s insistence on the primacy and constitutional 
supremacy of the norm on the prohibition of unconstitutional takeover of 
power absent the guarantee of impeccable national assembly election 
outcomes is the biggest and unmistakable contradiction of present times. 
Zimbabwe is not even a State party to the African Charter on Democracy 
Elections and Governance (2007).21 Zimbabwe is yet to even place its signature 
to that treaty.  
 
Yet Mr. Mugabe has as one of the core-achievements of his 37-years and 7 
months in power, the entrenchment of the constitutional norm on the absolute 
prohibition against unconstitutional takeover of power in the codified 
constitutional law of the SADC. Why had he invested so much effort into such 
a project and neglected institutionalising the requirement for dependable 
national assembly ballots?   
 
Under this norm it is illegal to mount a coup d'état.  Perpetrators face political 
oblivion. This has become a constitutional norm of extreme importance in 
both the SADC and the AU. The Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol 
on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (2014) - 
Malabo Protocol,22 recognises jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and 
                                                          
18 Ibid at: 
http://www.sadc.int/files/3613/5292/8367/Protocol_on_Politics_Defence_and_Security20001.p
df  
19 Ibid at: http://www.sadc.int/files/9113/5292/9434/SADC_Treaty.pdf ; See also SADC 
Regional Indicative Strategic development Plan available on the SADC website at: 
http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_Plan.p
df  
20 See preamble to the UN Charter (1945). 
21 See AU website at: https://au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-democracy-elections-and-
governance  
22 AU website at: https://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-amendments-protocol-statute-african-
court-justice-and-human-rights. See also Amended ACJHR Statute, Articles 28A; Ademola 
Abass, ‘Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa: Rationale, Prospects and 
Challenges’ European Journal of International Law (2013) pp. 933–946.Gerhard Kemp and 
Selemani Kinyunyu, ‘The Crime of Unconstitutional Change of Government (Article 28E)’ in 
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Human Rights’ (ACJHR) over 14 international and transnational crimes, 
including genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, the crime of 
unconstitutional change of government, piracy, terrorism, mercenarism, 
corruption, money laundering, trafficking in persons, trafficking in drugs, 
trafficking in hazardous wastes, illicit exploitation of natural resources, and 
the crime of aggression.  Article 28E (1)(a-f) defines the crime of 
unconstitutional change of government as committing or ordering to be 
committed the following acts, with the aim of illegally accessing or 
maintaining power:  
o A putsch or coup d’état against a democratically elected government; 
o An intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected 
government; 
o Any replacement of a democratically elected government by the use of 
armed dissidents or rebels or through political assassination; 
o Any refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the 
winning party or candidate after free, fair and regular elections; 
o Any amendment or revision of the Constitution or legal instruments, 
which is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of 
government or is inconsistent with the Constitution;  
Additionally, it is a crime under the Protocol to substantially modify the 
electoral laws in the last six months ahead of the elections without the consent 
of the majority of the political actors.  
Institutions for ensuring the absolute prohibition of the unconstitutional 
takeover of power have in some instances already been elaborately developed 
in the SADC. The SADC Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and 
Security Cooperation (2010)23 and the AU Peace and Security Council24  (PSC) - the 
AU’s standing organ for the prevention, management and resolution of 
conflicts are both robust and reliable mechanisms that African leaders now 
look to for their restoration to power in the event of a revolution. This fierce 
assault by African leadership, and by the SADC leadership in particular 
against citizens’ authority to decline and recall governments is one sided in 
that it is not matched by an equal and necessary absolute guarantee of safe 
reliable dependable and national assembly ballots to determine who 
legitimately governs these States as required under Article 25 of the UN 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Gerhard Welrle and Moritz Vormbaum, The African Criminal Court: A Commentary on the 
Malabo Protocol, Springer (2017) pp.57-50;  
23 SADC website: http://www.sadc.int/files/6313/6880/3040/03514_SADC_SIPO_English.pdf 
24 See AU Website at: https://au.int/en/organs/psc 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966).25 It is brazenly 
championed under the guise of peace, security and political stability 
initiatives.  
 
Yet SADC countries’ recent history on the question of the dependability of 
their national assembly ballots as authentic process for ensuring that citizens 
make the call on who governs over them is far from encouraging. Electoral 
fraud is one of the most complained about problems in the discourse on 
combatting corruption and good governance in the SADC generally. This is 
an anomaly that requires urgent correction if the SADC wishes to still insist 
on the primacy and supremacy of the constitutional norm on the absolute 
prohibition of unconstitutional takeover of power, and also if it wishes to 
enhance its uptake of foreign direct investment. As a precondition to 
enforcement of the former norm, a new constitutional normative structure of 
equal weight to the one on the absolute prohibition of unconstitutional 
takeover of power must be developed and enforced, targeting the 
requirement of absolute transparency and dependability of the national 
assembly ballot. 
 
To succeed in the circumstances, Operation Restore Freedom (2017) had to 
overcome the SADC trap against any military takeover of power in the sub-
region - the SADC constitutional norm on the absolute prohibition against 
unconstitutional takeover of power. 
 
 
ZDF strategy in the rejection/ circumvention of the SADC norm on the 
absolute prohibition of unconstitutional takeover of power: 
 
From the beginning of its intervention, the ZDF engaged the media and 
unambiguously and meticulously communicated that Operation Restore 
Legacy (2017) was not at all a coup d'état. Consequently, it could not be 
perceived as a breach of any strictures of Zimbabwean; SADC; or AU 
constitutional law. They deliberately referred to Mr Mugabe still, and 
throughout the operation, as their Commander-in-Chief, and also as the 
President of the Republic of Zimbabwe, even though they had placed him 
under house arrest. They let him have international calls with other SADC 
leaders. He was able even to perform his ceremonial duties as Chancellor of 
the Open University of Zimbabwe, and to give a televised address to the 
nation. This was followed by an immediate line up of the Service Chiefs who 
each saluted the President publicly on live national television broadcast at the 
end of that address.  
                                                          
25  6  ILM (1967) 368 
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They even established negotiation teams comprising South African and 
Zambian envoys to help resolve the political conundrum. For up to ten days, 
the ZDF persuaded Mr Mugabe to resign as President of Zimbabwe, but 
perhaps mindful of the unemployment statistics, which pointed to 95 per cent 
unemployment nationwide, Mr. Mugabe repeatedly scorned that request. All 
these facts combined to give Operation Restore Legacy (2017) the appearance 
of anything but a coup d'état.  
 
These calculations on the part of the ZDF, coupled with its persistent and 
unambiguous protestations that Operation Restore Legacy (2017) was not in 
any way a coup d'état at all, appeared to confuse and freeze the hand of the 
SADC leadership from making a joint and unequivocal triggering of the well-
rehearsed drastic dictates of the SADC constitutional norm on the absolute 
prohibition of unconstitutional takeover of power.26  
 
International media, so used to calling situations in clear terms was baffled by 
the unfolding military intervention also because although Operation Restore 
Legacy (2017) had been triggered by the ZDF, it immediately attracted 
spontaneous, voluntary, universal support of all Zimbabweans who then 
fanned its power fervently and unrelentingly from literally every part of the 
country. This sui generis operando compelled Western media to introduce a 
new vocabulary, namely, ‘a coup d'état that is not a coup’27 as its way to best 
characterise Operation Restore Legacy (2017) as it unfolded.  Under this light, 
it appears more appropriate to describe the operation as a measure to correct 
Zimbabwe’s governance destiny from a contrived family dynasty rule by the 




SADC Practice on the norm on the absolute prohibition of unconstitutional 
takeover of power: A threat to good governance, human rights and people’s 
sovereignty? 
 
Previous to Operation Restore Legacy (2017) the SADC has condemned 
unconstitutional takeover of power in Madagascar, Lesotho and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo.  
                                                          
26 See also Ben Chigara “What should a re-constituted Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) Tribunal be mindful of to succeed?” 81 Nordic Journal of International Law 
(3) pp. 341 - 377 





By its Double Troika Summit Communique28 of 14 January 2010 the SADC 
reiterarted its decision to suspend Madagascar from all SADC organs, 
structures and institutions until the restoration of constitutional order in that 
country. It called upon the AU, UN and other international organisations and 
institutions to also apply the same measure.  
 
The Troika rejected “any attempt to use democratic means, institutions and 
processes to legitimise Governments that came to power through 
unconstitutional means, and urged the international community, in particular 
the development partners, to support SADC’s eff orts to promote and sustain 
democracy in the region in general and Madagascar in particular”.29 
 
Further, the SADC Summit also rejected “the unilateral plan of Andry 
Rajoelina’s  ‘de facto’ Government of Madagascar to ‘reorganize’ the transition 
and hold legislative elections in March 2010, after his overthrow of President 
Ravalomanana. The SADC urged the international community to also reject 
and penalise the new regime. The AU immediately imposed targeted 
sanctions against Mr Rajoelina and his administration. The EU suspended 
development aid to Madagascar by adoption of what it called “appropriate 
measures”30 of the European Council, based on Article 96 of the Cotonou 
Agreement (2000),31 which refers to partner States’ approach to human rights, 
democratic principles and the rule of law. The measures entailed the 
suspension of the 10th European Development Fund (EDF) Country Strategy 
Paper as well as all cooperation projects implemented through the 
Government. 
 
This was not the first time that the SADC had intervened to stop an attempt at 
an unconstitutional takeover of power. President Nelson Mandela’s 
government had invoked in 1998 the SADC Organ for Conflict Prevention32 to 
put down a civilian backed military coup in Lesotho. 
 
                                                          
28 Issued at Maputo, Mozambique on 14 January 2010. SADC website: < www.sadc.int/index/ 
browse/page/672 >  
29 Ibid. 
30 See also EU website at: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/countries/madagascar_en 
31 15.12.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities L 317/3. See also EU website 
at: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/partnership-agreement-between-members-african-
caribbean-and-pacific-group-states-one-part-and_en 
32 “The Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (Organ) was launched in June 1996 as a 
formal institution of SADC with the mandate to support the achievement and maintenance of 
security and the rule of law in the SADC region.” SADC website at: http://www.sadc.int/sadc-
secretariat/directorates/office-executive-secretary/organ-politics-defense-and-security/ 
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Pursuant to Article 5(1) of the Treaty on Politics, Defence and Security in the 
SDAC Region,33 Pakalitha Mosisili, Prime Minister of Lesotho on 16 
September 1998 requested South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique to 
rescue his government from “a coup on our hands”.34 Article 5(1) of the treaty 
provides that: “Any member State can at any time request the Organ to 
convene in order to bring the existence or imminent threat of a conflict to its 
attention, in which case the Organ would be convened expeditiously”. 
 
The South African government obliged by sending a dawn advance party of 
600 troops, later joined by 250 from nearby Botswana, armoured cars, 
helicopter gunships and tanks. This appeared to be entirely consistent with 
Article 5(2)(2)35 of the treaty on Politics, Defence and Security in the SDAC 
Region.  
 
South Africa’s intervention ended with nine South African soldiers dead, and 
at least fifty-eight Lesotho soldiers and civilians killed.36 The Lesotho 
government was saved. Asked in Washington about the intervention, 
President Mandela argued that South Africa’s involvement in Lesotho’s 
internal problems had been necessitated by the need to prevent “chaos and 
anarchy”.37   
 
With equal force, Sydney Mufamadi, President Mandela’s Safety and Security 
minister stated: “We had no choice but to act”.38 The facts leading to the 
SADC force’s intervention beg questions that the SADC Protocol on conflict 
management and resolution never addresses. They include the guarantee to 
individuals’ right to democratic governance;39 the right to self-determination;40 
and what the UN has defined as individuals’ peace and security right claims 
under the human security understanding of the idea of sovereignty.  
 
                                                          
33 African Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 11 Part 1 (1999), p.197. 
34 Hawthorne, P., “The Battle for Lesotho”, Time Vol.152 No.14, 5 October 1998, p.39. 
35 In the case of intra-State conflicts, the Organ shall respond to an invitation by a member 
country to become involved in mediating a conflict within its boarders. 
36 BBC “World: Africa @Shoot to Kill’ in Lesotho” BBC website at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/178605.stm 
37 BBC “World: Africa @Shoot to Kill’ in Lesotho” BBC website at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/178605.stm 
38 Ibid. 
39 See especially Thomas M. Franck, “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance” 86 The 
American Journal of International Law, No. 1. (Jan., 1992), pp. 46-91. 
40 See especially UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples UN Doc 
A/Res/1514(XV) GAOR 15th Session Supp. 16, 66; “Legal Aspects of Self-determination” The 
Princeton Encyclopedia of Self Determination also available at: 
https://pesd.princeton.edu/?q=node/254 
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Neither President Mandela nor Mufamadi his Security Minister had 
considered that the sovereign right of the Sotho people to democratic 
governance under Article 25 of the ICCPR; nor exercise of their right to self-
determination were paramount. The sole-issue between the President and his 
Security Minister was the prevention of that which they had only guessed 
might follow even if there was no guarantee of their forecast coming to 
fruition in the little kingdom of two and a quarter million people, namely, 
anarchy and chaos. People were killed by the intervention and not before the 
intervention. The object of the intervention was as pleaded by the requesting 
authorities, namely, to rescue them and maintain them as the rulers, denying the 
people of Lesotho all the rights that Mr Mandela had previously stated that he 
had been prepared to die for. 
 
The intervention by the Lesotho defence forces had followed seven weeks of 
“unrest caused by allegations of fraud during general elections in May. 
…..The opposition complained that May’s general election, which gave the 
ruling Congress for Democracy 79 out of 80 seats, was rigged.”41 
 
Previous to Operation Restore Legacy (2017) the SADC had also previously 
intervened in the Democratic Republic of Congo. On 2 August 1998 a 
rebellion occurred against President Kabila of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo.42 Pursuant to the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security in the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) Region 199743 (the 
Protocol) a commission was established on 8 August 1998 in Harare to try and 
broker a peaceful settlement among the warring parties. The Commission 
comprised the foreign ministers of Zimbabwe,44 Zambia, Namibia and Angola 
(the four nations). On 18 August the Commission met in Goma, rebel leaders 
                                                          
41 41 BBC “World: Africa @Shoot to Kill’ in Lesotho” BBC website at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/178605.stm 
42 Zimbabwean forces’ claims to have Rwandese troops were confirmed by television 
interviews of the captured soldiers. See Michael Hartnack, “Congo Claims to have taken 2,000 
prisoners”, 29 September 1998, [http:.//www.bday.co.za/98/0929/world/w13.htm] 
43 11 African Journal of International and Comparative Law, Part 1 (1999), p.197. 
44 As Chairman of the proposed Organ on Politics, Defence and Security in the Region, and in 
response to President Kabila’s request for help convened the meeting as required of the 
Chairman under Articles 5(1) and 5(2)(2). 5(1) provides that, “Any member State can at any 
time request the Organ to convene in order to bring the existence or imminent threat of a 
conflict to its attention, in which case the Organ would be convened expeditiously”. 5(2(2) 
provides that, “In the case of intra-State conflicts, the Organ shall respond to an invitation by 
a member country to become involved in mediating a conflict within its borders”.  Article 
5(2)(1) states that: “Intra-State conflicts which could be subjected to regional intervention 
include: (a)large scale violence between sections of the population of a State, or between the 
State and/or its armed or para-military forces and sections of the population; 
(b) a threat to the legitimate authority of the government (such as a military coup by the 
armed or para-military forces) 
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and civilian leaders in an effort to determine whether Rwanda and Uganda 
had violated Congo’s borders and were helping the rebels.45 This followed 
earlier meetings with Ugandan officials and Rwandese officials and President 
Kabila in Kinshasa.46 On 19 August, the Commission reported its findings. 
Moven Mahachi, Zimbabwe’s Defence Minister, is quoted as having 
announced on local radio that:  
 
… it had become clear that Congo had been invaded (by Rwandan and 
Ugandan soldiers aiding the Congolese insurgents). … It was 
unanimously agreed that we must, with urgency, make sure practical 
assistance, both material and manpower, is given to (Congo) in order 
to restore peace and stability.47  
 
The SADC leadership is ever-so-keen to implement the norm on the absolute 
prohibition of unconstitutional takeover of power. This readiness compels a 
deeper inquiry into the question of whether SADC governments have the 
human rights credentials that merit possession of such a power. Enjoyment of 
that power must presuppose a sound human rights record on behalf of SADC 
governments. UN Human Rights Treaty monitoring bodies’ periodic reports 
are less than flattering for this region. Yet a social contract between the 
governed and their leaders is implicit in the norm on the absolute prohibition 
of unconstitutional takeover of power. Otherwise it would not make sense at 
all in light of the emergent UN human rights culture. That human rights 
qualifying record required for this norm to subsist should derive from: 
 
1) A State’s participation in at least fifteen of the current stoke of eighteen 
international human rights instruments. 
2) Participating in all of the current nine human rights treaty monitoring 
bodies and recognizing individuals rights petition/communicate any 
alleged human rights breaches to the relevant treaty monitoring body. 
3) Establishing a National Human Rights Committee with powers and 
means to expeditiously process human rights claims within the State. 
4) Demonstrating a clear record of holding verifiable free and fair 
national assembly elections. 
 
                                                          
45 Stan Mudenge, Zimbabwe’s foreign minister is quoted as having stated: “We’re here to find 
out whether this is an invasion or an internal invasion.”  Ian Stewart (The Associated Press), 
“Kabila’s Grasp Slipping”, ABC News Com. 19 August 1998.  
[http://archive.abcnews.com/world/DailyNews/Congo980818.html] 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ian Stewart (The Associated Press), “Four Nations throw in with Kabila”, ABC News Com. 
19 August 1998.  [http://archive.abcnews.com/sections/world/DailyNews/Congo980819.html] 
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Secondly, for that claim-right to subsist, it must be linked to UN good 
governance (GG) criteria. The UN OHCHR writes that GG encompasses: 
 
… full respect of human rights, the rule of law, effective participation, 
multi-actor partnerships, political pluralism, transparent and 
accountable processes and institutions, an efficient and effective public 
sector, legitimacy, access to knowledge, information and education, 
political empowerment of people, equity, sustainability, and attitudes 
and values that foster responsibility, solidarity and tolerance. 
 
[It] … relates to political and institutional processes and outcomes that 
are deemed necessary to achieve the goals of development. … Good 
governance is the process whereby public institutions conduct public 
affairs, manage public resources and guarantee the realization of 
human rights in a manner essentially free of abuse and corruption, and 
with due regard for the rule of law. The true test of "good" governance 
is the degree to which it delivers on the promise of human rights: civil, 
cultural, economic, political and social rights.48 
 
In Resolution 2000/64 the UN Commission on Human Rights49 identified the 
following attributes of GG: transparency; responsibility; accountability; 
participation and responsiveness to the needs of the people as the key 
performance indicators of GG. The ZDF Spokesperson stated that Operation 
Restore Legacy (2017) had evidently been motivated by criminality of those 
closely linked to Mr Mugabe both inside and outside government. With 
national unemployment at 95 per cent, and possibilities of Ph.D. degree 
awards without previous undergraduate studies even, following only two 
months of registration with the University of Zimbabwe, the like-it or, lump-it 
approach50 in Mr Mugabe’s Zimbabwe pointed to a State very remote from 
UN GG standards and with no hope of normal recovery.  
 
Lip-service to democratic governance is littered in numerous documents that 
Zimbabwe and other SADC States could have ratified but which their realities 
often contradict. They include the Constitutive Act of the African Union 
(2000);51 The Lomé Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government 
                                                          
48 UN OHCHR website at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/GoodGovernance/Pages/GoodGovernanceInd
ex.aspx 
49 26 April 2000 E/CN.4/RES/2000/64 
50 See also Mpazi Sinjela, ‘The African Convention on the Prevention and Combating of 
Corruption’ in The African Union: Legal and Institutional Framework – A Manual on the 
Pan-African Organization (2012) Brill pp. 291-301. 
51 OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/23.15, entered into force May 26, 2001. 
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(2000);52 and the African Charter on Democracy Elections and Governance 
adopted on 30 January 2007.53 Although it required only 15 instruments of 
ratification to bring it into force out of the possible 55 States, it took a full five 
years, one month and two weeks to achieve that and to bring it into force. As 
of January 2018 State parties that had ratified the treaty were in the 30s out of 
a possible 55 African States.  
 
Ominously, Zimbabwe has neither signed nor ratified this treaty which seeks 
to promote and protect citizens’ democratic entitlement by committing 
member States parties to honour that entitlement. Yet, Mr. Mugabe was the 
champion for installation and recognition of the prohibition of 
unconstitutional takeover of power in the SADC and beyond. His wariness 
with the idea of democratic governance was matched only by his 
determination to stop others from assuming power undemocratically.  
 
 
The SADC norm on the absolute prohibition of unconstitutional takeover 
of power - “A blunt counter-good governance tool”  
 
As presently constituted and implemented, the SADC constitutional norm on 
the absolute prohibition of unconstitutional takeover of power appears to be a 
blunt counter-good governance tool for the subjugation of SADC populations by 
the ruling elite. The SADC leadership upholds it regardless of any 
protestations from frustrated affected populations. There are no exceptions to 
this norm. Yet, the virtue it presumes of political leadership of SADC States is 
hard to find in the majority of cases.  
 
For instance, only three of the fifteen SADC Member States parties have 
ratified the UN Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced 
Disappearances (2006) – (CPED). This convention could be described as the 
litmus test of good governance. Alarmingly only one-fifth of SADC States are 
Parties to this convention, namely Lesotho, from 6 December 2013; Malawi, 
from 14 July 2013 and Zambia, from 4 April 2011. The rest are not.  
 
Article 2 of the CPED defines enforced disappearance as: 
 
…. the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of 
liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting 
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed 
                                                          
52 AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI) 
53 See AU website at: https://au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-democracy-elections-and-
governance 
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by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by 
concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, 
which place such a person outside the protection of the law. 
 
The Convention has a treaty body for monitoring States compliance with its 
obligations which include, inter alia the requirement: 
  
1. To enact specific laws establishing the crime of enforced 
disappearance.  
2. To investigate complaints and reports of enforced disappearance and 
bring those responsible to justice.  
3. To prevent the menace by detaining persons only in officially 
approved and monitored institutions in which all prisoners are 
registered, ensure the absolute right to Habeas corpus (a legal action, 
through which a prisoner can be released from unlawful detention, 
that is, detention lacking sufficient cause or evidence).  
4. To prevent concealment of the whereabouts of arrested persons so that 
no one finds themselves placed outside the protection of the law. 
5. That the right of victims and their families to know the truth regarding 
the circumstances and fate of the disappeared person be observed.   
6. To criminalize the unlawful abduction of children whose parents were 
victims of enforced disappearance as well as the faking of these 
children’s identities and their adoption. 
 
Mugabe’s Zimbabwe has been cited persistently in the work of the monitoring 
body - the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances. For 
instance in its report of 21 December 200954 the Working Group on Enforced 
or Involuntary Disappearances requested investigatory visits to Zimbabwe 
following from reports of Mugabe’s failure to protect people from forced or 
involuntary disappearances.55  
 
It is curious that SADC States are reluctant to participate in this good- 
governance-test convention. This is in stark contrast to respective 
governments’ unashamed championing and setting up of robust sub- regional 
and regional regimes and mechanisms for insulating one another from public 
rejection of their oppression.  
 
Until the very end of Operation Restore Legacy (2017), Mugabe appeared to 
exude confidence throughout that the sophisticated ZDF action would suffer 
                                                          
54 UN Doc A/HRC/13/31 
55 See UN website at: https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G09/177/04/PDF/G0917704.pdf?OpenElement 
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delegitimation of both the SADC and the AU whom he had nurtured to react 
one way only in such circumstances. He had also given them the legal norm 
to point to as justification for putting down ‘unconstitutional power 
takeovers’ – the constitutional norm on the absolute prohibition of 
unconstitutional takeover of power. 
 
This norm is referenced directly and indirectly throughout the Strategic 
Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation 
(2010).56 It is explicitly codified in Para. 1.2.8, which states that:  
 
Though there is relative peace and stability in the region, there are 
challenges in the form of climate change, economic recession, 
unconstitutional change of governments, the growing vulnerability of 
national borders, 
 
The treaty obsesses with protection against unconstitutional takeover of 
power without linking that or coupling it with the requirement for 
governments to commit to recognizing, promoting and protecting the human 
rights of their populations. In paragraph 5.2 the treaty powers are justified by 
the claim that “subversion of the constitutional order and national 
sovereignty” are a major challenge for SADC governments.57 
 
Mr. Edgar Lungu, the Zambian President and SADC leader most astute about 
the virtues of the norm on the absolute prohibition of unconstitutional 
takeover of power was the first to swing into action from Egypt where he was 
visiting, by declaring that: “…. the illegal takeover of power in Zimbabwe by 
the military is not in tune with modern politics”.58 He was further quoted as 
saying: “SADC will negotiate the way forward with Mugabe as Head of State, 
…. the army goes back to the barracks.” Local media outlets further reported 
him stating that his troops were ready to support and uphold Mugabe’s 
regime.59  
 
Lungu’s behaviour is a perfect fit for the irrational category not least because 
Zimbabweans of all persuasions, backgrounds and political affiliations 
unanimously endorsed the ZDF intervention. They instantaneously and 
spontaneously flooded the streets across the country, and any form of social 
                                                          
56 SADC website: http://www.sadc.int/files/6313/6880/3040/03514_SADC_SIPO_English.pdf 
57 http://www.sadc.int/files/6313/6880/3040/03514_SADC_SIPO_English.pdf 
58 See also Lusakan Times Newspapers at: https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/11/16/illegal-
takeover-power-zimbabwe-not-tune-modern-politics-president-lungu/ 
59 See Wilbert Mukori, “Zambian Army to invade Zimbabwe to help Mugabe: Lungu, keep 
your nose out of Zimbabwe affairs” at Bulawayo 24 News, http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-
opinion-sc-columnist-byo-122178.html  
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media accessible to them imploring the SADC and the AU not to meddle in 
their affairs.  
 
There were tweets and re-tweets with the hashtag: “#SADCBackOffZim”; and 
others declaring: “There is a special place in hell for anyone – SADC, Zuma, 
AU – that tries to get between a scorned dictator and his people. Zimbabwe 
has been cheated of real change before; it can’t be allowed to happen again”.60  
 
Such a radical confirmation of the democratic entitlement approach to 
national governmental legitimacy is mandatory to secure the inalienable 
rights of citizens. Its demand has probably not been so vigorously expressed 
for a very long time now in Zimbabwe’s modern history.61 Democratic 
entitlement theory insists that governments derive their just powers from the 
consent of the governed. For this reason, Edgar Lungu’s remarks raise 
significant concerns about the object, purpose and utility of SADC values to 
SADC citizens under modern international law, which has realigned 
sovereignty claims to human security concerns instead of the previous State 
security concerns.62  
 
The remarks also contradict Zimbabwe’s enduring ancient convention: chava-
Chimurenga/ sesi-Inkululekho/ time to resist oppression manifested by Operation 
Restore Legacy (2017). The remarks pit people’s sovereignty against 
protectionism of the ruling elite. South African President Jacob Zuma is 
reported to have telephoned Mugabe who had been placed under house 
                                                          
60 See also ISS Today, “The African Union’s chequered history with military coups” ISSAfrica 
Website at: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-african-unions-chequered-history-with-military-
coups 
61 Thomas M. Franck, “The emerging right to democratic governance” 86 American Journal of 
International Law No. 1 p 46. 
62 See especially UN Human Security website at: http://www.un.org/humansecurity/human-
security-unit/human-security-approach ;  and at: 
http://www.un.org/humansecurity/sites/www.un.org.humansecurity/files/human_security_i
n_theory_and_practice_english.pdf ; See also Ben Chigara, “The ILO, harbinger and chief 
protagonist for the recognition and promotion of the inherent dignity of Sub-Saharan Africa 
labour', in Abass, A. (ed.) Protecting Human Security in Africa. Oxford University Press 
(2010); S. Neil MacFarlane  (Author), Yuen Foong Khong, Human Security and the UN: A 
Critical History (United Nations Intellectual History Project Series), 2006 
Alex J. Bellamy and Matt McDonald “The Utility of Human Security': Which Humans? What 
Security? A Reply to Thomas & Tow” 33 Security Dialogue No. 3 pp.373-377 
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arrest and dispatched soon afterwards his security chiefs to go and meet with 
Mugabe in Harare.63  
 
 
SADC Member States Parties’ Human Rights disinclinations v. Revolution 
as Kelsen’s possible second means of change of grundnorm 
 
Human security is assured when governments subject themselves inter alia to 
external monitoring of their human rights practices, something that SADC 
States appear loath to do. There are nine international human rights treaties, 
and nine optional human rights protocols bringing together the total number 
of international human rights instruments to 18.64 SADC States’ participation 
in these instruments is worryingly low; particularly their participation in 
treaty bodies that monitor Member States Parties’ compliance with their 
obligations under each corresponding treaty.  
 
There is a universal constitution for the recognition, promotion and protection 
of the inherent dignity of their citizens. It is called the International Bill of 
Human Rights. SADC States’ circumvention of this constitution, coupled with 
its lip-service to the recognition, promotion and protection of the inherent 
dignity of individuals on their territories contrasts sharply with their zeal to 
insist that citizens can use only national assembly ballots to change 
leadership. But national assembly ballots do not have a very good record of 
registering the people’s choice of leadership in many of these States. This fact 
alone undermines SADC leadership’s claim-right to not be unconstitutionally 
removed from office by their populations who may have no other means, 
elections being the least likely possible way of doing that because of ruthlessly 
efficient electoral fraud practices in the African sub-region. 
Status of Ratifications of the current stock of 18 International Human 
Rights Instruments: 
                                                          
63 “Zimbabwe: Zuma says Mugabe under house arrest but is 'fine” IOL website: 
https://www.iol.co.za/news/special-features/zimbabwe/zimbabwe-zuma-says-mugabe-under-
house-arrest-but-is-fine-12010473. See also Reuters “Zimbabwe’s Mugabe told Zuma he was 
confined to home but fine: South African Presidency” at:  
https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKBN1DF1EF-OZATP 
64 Visit <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx> last 




 Category 1: 15-18 = shaded in dark-blue (No SADC State has ratified this 
many) 
 
Category 2: 10-14 = shaded in sky-blue (Only two thirds of SADC States 
have ratified this 
many: Madagascar, Seychelles, Mozambique, South Africa, 
Namibia, Angola, Malawi, Tanzania, Lesotho, Swaziland) 
 
Category 3: 5-9 = shaded in orange (Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana) 
 
Category 4: 0-4 = shaded in maroon 
 
 
Source: United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights.65 
                                                          
65 UN Website at: http://indicators.ohchr.org/ 
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66 UN General Assembly, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Adopted by the General Assembly on 21 December 1965, entered into force on 
1 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195. 
67 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(Adopted by the General Assembly at New York on 16 December 1966, entered into force on 
3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3. 
68 UN General Assembly, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (Adopted by the General Assembly at New York on 10 December 2008, 
entered into force on 5 March 2013) UNGA Res. A/RES/63/117 (10 December 2008).  
69 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Adopted by the 
General Assembly on 16 December 1966, entered into force on 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171. 
70 See un Website at:  <http://indicators.ohchr.org> 
71 UN General Assembly, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (Adopted by the General Assembly at New York on 16 December 1966, entered into 
force on 23 March 1972) 999 UNTS 171. 
72 UN General Assembly, Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty (Adopted by the General Assembly at 
New York on 15 December 1989, entered into force on 11 July 1991) 1642 UNTS 414. 
73 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Form of Discrimination against 
Women (Adopted by the General Assembly at New York on 18 December 1979, entered into 
force on 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13. 
 24 
Somalia States (27) States (9) 































21 out of 54 3 out of 15     
ICPED 
(2006) 80 
16 out of 54 4 out of 15     
CRPD(2007)81 
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74 UN General Assembly, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (Adopted by the General Assembly at New York on 6 October 
1999, entered into force on 2 December 2000) 2131 UNTS 83. 
75 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child (Adopted by the General 
Assembly at New York on 20 November 1989, entered into force on 2 September 1990) 1577 
UNTS 3. 
76 UN General Assembly, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
involvement  
of children in armed conflict (Adopted by the General Assembly at New York on 25 May 2000, 
entered into force on 12 February 2002) 2173 UNTS 222. 
77 UN General Assembly, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale 
of children, child prostitution and child pornography (Adopted by the General Assembly at New 
York on 25 May 2000, entered into force on 18 January 2002) 2171 UNTS 227. 
78 UN General Assembly, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a 
communications procedure (Adopted by the General Assembly at New York on 19 December 
2011, entered into force on 14 April 2014) UNGA Res. A/RES/66/138 (19 December 2011). 
79 UN General Assembly, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families (Adopted by the General Assembly at New York on 18 
December 1990, entered into force on 1 July 2003) 2220 UNTS 3. 
80 UN General Assembly, International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance (Adopted by the General Assembly at New York on 20 December 2006, entered 
into force on 23 December 2010) 2716 UNTS 3. 
81 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Adopted at New 
York on 30 March 2007, entered into force on 3 May 2008) UNGA Res. A/RES/61/106 (24 
January 2007). 
82 UN General Assembly, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (Adopted by the General Assembly at New York on 13 December 2006, entered 
into force on 3 May 2008) 2518 UNTS 283. 
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During his thirty-seven-year-rule of Zimbabwe Mugabe had distanced his 
government away from recognising the international human rights 
procedures that allow individuals to submit claims to human rights treaty 
monitoring bodies.84 In the post-Mugabe era, Zimbabwe must make haste to 
do more to achieve a pro-human rights democratic status. It should distance 
itself away from the SADC norm on the absolute prohibition against 
unconstitutional takeover of power until a parallel regime of similar weight 
requiring sanctity of national assembly ballots has been established as a 
constitutional norm of the SADC. In any event, Zambia, Angola, and South 
Africa’s insistence that Zimbabwe’s Operation Restore Legacy (2017) fell 
under SADC norm85 is symptomatic of the decrepit values of the SADC, and a 
mockery of logic because: 
 
1) In his notice of 21 November 2017to the Speaker of Parliament – Jacob 
Mudenda, resigning as President of the Republic of Zimbabwe, 
Mugabe made it clear that he had voluntarily reached the decision to 
step down as Head of State, allowing for procedures for his 
replacement.86 
                                                          
83 UN General Assembly, Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Adopted by the General Assembly at New 
York on 18 December 2002, entered into force on 22 June 2006) 2375 UNTS 237. 
84 See  “Reporting Status of Zimbabwe” OHCHR website at: 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/countries.aspx?CountryCode=ZWE
&Lang=EN 
85 See  “21 November 2017 Communiqué of The Summit of The Organ Troika Plus SADC 
Chair on The Political Situation in The Republic of Zimbabwe”, SADC Website at: 
http://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/communique-summit-organ-troika-plus-sadc-chair-
political-situation-republic-zimbabwe/ ; See also  
 “SADC Organ Troika Plus Council Chairperson Ministerial Meeting on Zimbabwe Situation” 
SADC Website at: http://www.sadc.int/files/8515/1076/4955/Media_Advisory_-
_SADC_meet_on_Zimbabwe_situation.pdf ; “The SADC Organ Troika Plus Council 
Chairperson Ministerial Meeting was held at the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone, Republic of 
Botswana on 16th November 2017” Polity Website at: http://www.polity.org.za/article/sadc-
sadc-organ-troika-plus-council-chairperson-ministerial-meeting-on-zimbabwe-situatio-2017-
11-17 
86 See also “FULL LETTER: Robert Mugabe’s resignation notice” News24 website at: 
https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/full-letter-robert-mugabes-resignation-notice-
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2) In what was to be his last address to the nation as President of 
Zimbabwe, Mugabe repeatedly stressed on 19 November 2017 that the 
Military High Command’s intervention, namely, Operation Restore 
Legacy, was constitutional.87 
3) Even the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Moussa Faki 
Mahamat on 21 November 2017 welcomed the decision by President 
Robert Mugabe to step down from his position as Head of State 
following a lifetime of service to the Zimbabwean nation.88 
4) The High Court of Zimbabwe Order of 24 November 2017 declares that 
the ZDF’s intervention to stop Mugabe’s unconstitutional actions were 
themselves constitutional under the Zimbabwean Constitution.89  
 
The Heads of States of the three nations, namely, Angola, South Africa, and 
Zambia; and others convened on 21 November 2017 at Luanda, Angola an 
SADC Summit meeting under the Organ on Politics Defence and Security 
Cooperation, to discuss Zimbabwe’s Operation Restore Legacy (2017) under 
the light of the SADC norm on the absolute prohibition of unconstitutional 
takeover of power. They “… noted with great concern the unfolding political 
situation in the Republic of Zimbabwe, and resolved that H.E.  President 
Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma, in his capacity as the Chairperson of SADC, and 
H.E João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, in his capacity as Chairperson of the 
Organ on Politics Defence and Security Cooperation will immediately 
undertake a mission to Zimbabwe on 22 November, 2017 to assess the 
situation”.90 Clearly this norm is a blunt tool and a definite euphemism for the 
proposition that: ‘Unpopular or illegitimate SADC leaders are immutable: 
touch them and we come after you!’ Once the ‘Comrade in distress call’ 
reaches the SADC Organ Troika, it has to act, and act only to restore the 
unpopular or illegitimate leadership under siege from its own citizens. The 
ZDF was acutely aware of this fact from the beginning. 
 
The SADC’s cautious approach to international human rights protection 
recommends that it should not be allowed under International Law – not even 
                                                                                                                                                                      
20171121; http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/zimbabwe-mugabe-latest-
resignation-how-it-unfolded-timeline-events-a8068186.html  
87 See also CNN website at: http://edition.cnn.com/videos/world/2017/11/19/robert-mugabe-
addresses-nation-full-remarks.cnn 
88 AU Website at: http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-statement-zimbabwe-
21nov2017english.pdf 
89 Case No. HC 10820/17  
90 See “21 Nov, 2017 Communiqué of The Summit of The Organ Troika Plus SADC Chair on 




under Article 52 of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (1945)91 on Regional 
Arrangements, the blank cheque of control over citizens’ last and often only 
means to rid themselves of unpopular or illegitimate leadership which, the 
norm on the absolute prohibition of unconstitutional change of government 
seeks to achieve. That would be contrary to the purposes and mission of the 
UN Charter.92  
 
Operation Restore Legacy (2017) recommends the view that the discretionary 
authorisation of regional and by implication sub-regional entities like the 
SADC to take peace and security initiatives at regional level requires the UN 
Security Council to continually audit all regional and sub-regional peace and 
security arrangements for two things. One is fitness for purpose in view of 
human rights law. The second is their legitimacy.  
 
The ICJ ruled in the Asylum case93 that he party invoking regional law must 
show that the other party had actually consented to be bound by that norm 
and not merely acquiesced to it. By invoking the ancient Zimbabwean 
constitutional norm - Chimurenga/ Inkululekho/ Resistance of oppression against 
the SADC norm on the absolute prohibition of unconstitutional change of 
power, Zimbabwean citizens have demonstrated that they are not bound by 
SADC norms and practices that are indifferent to good governance. But it is 
the State that conducts international relations and not its citizens.  
 
This raises the question whether Zimbabwean citizens could bypass their 
State representatives and recuse themselves from previously agreed 
international obligations. Perhaps they could, where their State 
representatives have usurped their trust and teamed up with others to 
establish counter-human rights protection initiatives contrary to the emergent 
UN human rights culture. Abuse of public trust might merit retraction from 
agreements established contrary to the expectations of that trust.  
 
In ex parte Pinochet Ugarte No.394 Lord Hope stated that acts of State leaders 
that are contrary to the functions of their offices are not protected by 
International Law doctrines on the immunity of Head of State because by 
their nature they are neither required nor expected in the office bearer’s role. 
It could be argued entering into counter-good governance agreements for 
insulating political leaders from removal from public office is not one of the 
reasons why the public invests its trust in those that it elects to positions of 
                                                          
91 1945, 1 UNTS XVI 
92 See preamble to the UN Charter (1945) Ibid. 
93
 (Columbia v Peru) ICJ Reports 1950 p.266. 
94 [2000] 1 A.C. 147 Also available at UK Parliament website at: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199899/ldjudgmt/jd990324/pino4a.htm 
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public office. Should citizens not be able under International Law to disregard 
such treaty arrangements because they never entrusted their leaders to do any 
such thing on their behalf? If a Leader transfers billions of national reserve 
funds to a foreign jurisdiction, they cannot later invoke immunity from 
prosecution because looting State funds is not the proper exercise of the trust 
invested in the office bearer by their citizens. Per Lord Hope: 
  
It may be said that it is not one of the functions of a head of state to commit acts 
which are criminal according to the laws and constitution of his own state or which 
customary international law regards as criminal. But I consider that this approach to 
the question is unsound in principle. The principle of immunity ratione materiae 
protects all acts which the head of state has performed in the exercise of the functions 
of government. The purpose for which they were performed protects these acts from 
any further analysis. There are only two exceptions to this approach which customary 
international law has recognised. The first relates to criminal acts which the head of 
state did under the colour of his authority as head of state but which were in reality 
for his own pleasure or benefit. …. the head of state who kills his gardener in a fit of 
rage or who orders victims to be tortured so that he may observe them in agony seem 
to me plainly to fall into this category and, for this reason, to lie outside the scope of 
the immunity. The second relates to acts the prohibition of which has acquired the 
status under international law of jus cogens.95  
   
By Operation Restore Legacy (2017) Zimbabwean citizens may have cut 
themselves loose from SADC indifference to good governance. While 
international law requires good governance, SADC appears to be indifferent 
to it. Perhaps there are at least two completely different contemplations of the 
SADC. One of the citizenry, which contemplates the human rights 
requirements of internal self-determination, democratic rule, rule of law, and 
other tenets of good governance; and another that, prioritises leadership 
protection from recall from public office under the guise of peace and security 
initiatives.  
 
Unfortunately, development of SADC constitutional norms appears to have 
neglected the establishment of norms for the promotion of the SADC 
contemplated by the citizenry. Rather, it has concentrated on promotion of an 
SADC for the protection of unpopular or illegitimate leadership from rejection 
by the citizens. This has created a David and Goliath situation between SADC 
populations on the one hand, and on the other, unpopular or illegitimate 
leadership.  
 
The latter is closer to UN values of good governance and democratic rule than 
the former. But it is the former that has international responsibility for 
Zimbabwe’s foreign relations with other States. However, that responsibility 
is held only on trust of Zimbabwe’s citizens and for their collective benefit. 




Therefore, where State authorities franchise citizens’ trust against citizens’ 
interest to deny them good governance,  those same authorities can no longer 
claim to be appropriately exercising the trust of their citizens, particularly 
where citizens object to such franchise. This is because the UN has 
reconceptualised State security moving away from previous “traditional state-
centric conceptions of security that focused primarily on the safety of states 
from military aggression, to one that concentrates on the security of the 
individuals, their protection and empowerment (by) … drawing attention to a 
multitude of threats that cut across different aspects of human life and thus 
highlighting the interface between security, development and human rights; 
and … promoting a new integrated, coordinated and people-centred 
approach to advancing peace, security and development within and across 
nations.96 
 
Additionally it seems appropriate to recommend that, any SADC ‘peace and 
security’ related requests to the AU, UN, EU and other entities, to implement 
punitive measures against any named SADC State should always be treated 
with caution because unconstitutional takeover of power in the sub-region is 
often preceded by a record of successive stolen national assembly elections, 
denying affected populations of any other possibility of ending unpopular or 
illegitimate rule or both.  
 
Even more importantly, Operation Restore Legacy (2017) recommends that 
any SADC interventions in any takeover of power scenario should be 
restricted. What turned out to be in the words of both Robert Mugabe himself, 
and the High Court of Zimbabwe, a very constitutional takeover of power 
from Mugabe in Zimbabwe had, immediately it had begun to unfold, been 
declared illegal by both President Edgar Lungu of Zambia and by the AU 
Chairperson, the President of Gabon.  
 
President Lungu had gone further than others to threaten military action 
against Operation Restore Legacy (2017). This is most surprising not least 
because the majority of SADC States had fought against foreign rule of 
British, Portuguese and German, protesting human rights abuses of their 
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colonial masters. In some cases the same liberators have become worse 
abusers of individuals’ human rights than their former colonial masters.  
 
Further, the SADC norm on the absolute prohibition of unconstitutional 
takeover of power rules out Kelsen’s second means of possible change of the 
basic norm or grundnorm – a revolution.97 This defies logic particularly when 
the state of affairs has often deteriorated into abject political, social and 
economic malaise. Moreover, the SADC’s own record of ensuring democratic 
elections is uninspiring. Even worse, the SADC has no credibility in resolving 
cases of stolen elections. Hence its leadership’s instinctive clamours for the 
suppression of events like Operation Restore Legacy (2017). This casts the 
SADC as a primitive safeguard tool for authoritarian rule. But democratic 
entitlement has become under UN Human Rights Law the first building block 
of legitimacy and of good government. Consequently, force alone is no longer 
sufficient to govern people. 
 
More importantly, Zimbabweans may have declared by that operation that 
they have entered an era in which only democracy and the rule of law98 will 
be the recognized test for governmental validity. This is because, “… To be 
effective, law needs to secure the habitual, voluntary compliance of its 
subjects; it cannot rely entirely, or even primarily on, upon the commanding 
power of a sovereign to compel obedience. Consequently, governments no 
longer blinded by totalitarian miasma seek to validate themselves in such a 
way as to secure a high degree of voluntary public acquiescence in the 
governing process. Consent benefits the governing as much as the 
governed.”99  The UN Secretary General has defined the rule of law as: 
  
…a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and 
entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to 
laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and 
independently adjudicated and which are consistent with international 
human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to 
ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before 
the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, 
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separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, 
avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.100 
 
In spite of its best efforts to appear inclined to this principle, the SADC needs 
to do more to merit pro-rule of law status. Louw-Aaudran writes that the 
SADC’s intervention in Zimbabwe in the mid-2000s that led to the 
Government of National Unity (GNU) from 2008-13, led by Mugabe, was 
severely criticised in many quarters. “Notably, crucial provisions of the 
Global Political Agreement that led to the GNU were not implemented. The 
AU also repeatedly rubber-stamped elections in Zimbabwe despite serious 
allegations of fraud,”101 certainly disenfranchising Zimbabweans and 
protecting its leadership’s “Mentor” – Mr. Mugabe. 
 
Botswana President Ian Khama is widely reported to have declared the last 
Zimbabwe election a sham while both the SADC and the AU approved it as a 
free and exercise of Zimbabweans will. In frustration President Khama is 
reported to have declared that, his country would “not participate in future 
SADC election observer missions after he noted what he says were 
irregularities in Zimbabwe’s disputed 31 July elections.”102 He argued that 
both the AU and the SADC had paid a blind eye to “irregularities in last 
year’s [2013] Zimbabwe harmonised polls and accused the blocs of endorsing 
the elections even though they were not fair”.103 
 
On 15 November, the Chairperson of the Commission of the AU, Moussa Faki 
Mahamat urged “… all stakeholders to address the situation in accordance 
with Zimbabwe’s constitution and the relevant instruments of the African 
Union, including the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and 
Governance”.104  This obsession with constitutions that house blunt tools for 
subjugating populations under dictatorial rule is a worrying trait among 
African States and the SADC in particular. Unless the AU and SADC have 
previously ensured a free and fair election in a Member State party, they 
should not invoke democratic legitimacy to protect non-democratically 
installed regimes. That just delegitimizes them both as intellectual wobblers 
that are ignorant of the value to good governance of what Thomas Franck 
                                                          
100 Report of the Secretary-General on The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and 
post-conflict societies (S/2004/616). See also ‘UN Secretary General, ‘What is the rule of law?’ 
UN website at: https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/what-is-the-rule-of-law/ 
101 ISS Today, “The African Union’s chequered history with military coups” ISSAfrica Website 
at: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-african-unions-chequered-history-with-military-coups 
102 News 24 “Botswana 'breaks ranks with SADC, AU”, News 24 Website at: 
https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Botswana-breaks-ranks-with-SADC-AU-20140127 
103 Ibid. 
104 See AU Website at: http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/statement-by-the-chairperson-of-auc-
on-zimbabwe-ff.pdf  
 32 
described over a quarter century ago as the “prescient glimpse of the 
legitimating power of the community of nations”.105 
 
Rotating AU Chairperson, Guinea’s President Alpha Condé reacted in similar 
vein at the start of Zimbabwe’s Operation Restore Legacy (2017); stating that 
the AU “ … will never accept a military coup d'état. We insist on the respect of 
the constitution and a return to constitutional rule”.106 Through various treaty 
instruments, the AU has proscribed unconstitutional change of government, 
leading to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council107 - the AU’s 
standing organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts.  
 
Nonetheless, constitutionalism that pays only lip service to democratic 
governance is inimical to peace building because as Operation Restore Legacy 
(2017) shows, democracy has become the sine qua non for legitimacy. In a 
nutshel, Operation Restore Legacy (2017) was born out of common revulsion 
among Zimbabweans against the Mugabe contrived family dynasty rule of 
Zimbabwe.  
 
According to Franck the international community has vigorously asserted and 
established that, “only democracy validates government. … The 
transformation of the democratic entitlement from moral prescription to 
international legal obligation has evolved gradually …. [and]  … it has 
accelerated.  Most remarkable is the extent to which an international law-
based entitlement is now urged by governments themselves”.108 This 
recommends the view that until the SADC can ensure beyond reasonable 
doubt that national assembly elections always guarantee a free and fair 
expression of the will of the respective States’ populations about who should 
govern them; the SADC has a very weak, and even unsustainable case for 
insisting upon the implementation of its norm on the absolute prohibition of 
unconstitutional takeover of power. 
 
 
The Right to internal self-determination: A fundamental of the UN 
nomenclature on peace, security and development 
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The right of citizens to internally determine freely who may govern them, by 
determining for example how they pursue their economic, social, and cultural 
development occupies “… a central position in international law as a primary 
principle in the creation and destruction of states. It features in Article 1 of the 
UN Charter as one of the purposes of the organization. It is positioned as the 
first right in the twin Human Rights Covenants: ICCPR and ICESCR. Many 
commentators argue for its peremptory or jus cogens status.”109 
 
Self-determination of peoples certainly belongs to the elite norms of the UN. 
This is evidenced in that it is specifically inscribed into the preamble of the 
UN Charter as one of the purposes for which the organization has been 
established to achieve. Thus, the UN Trusteeship Council110 for overseeing the 
granting of political independence to non-self-governing territories was 
established as one of the five organs of the UN.  
 
The right to self-determination is habitually referenced as an example of jus 
cogens. Lord Hope made it clear in exparte Pinochet Ugarte No. 3 that although 
the principle of immunity ratione materiae protects all acts which the head of 
state has performed in the exercise of the functions of government, it does not 
apply to acts prohibited by norms that have acquired the status of jus cogens 
under international law. “This compels all states to refrain from such conduct 
under any circumstances and imposes an obligation erga omnes to punish such 
conduct”. 111  
 
Consequently, any treaty calculated to place restrictions on jus cogens or, to 
deny its effect is null and void under international law.112 SADC treaties that 
conflict the jus cogens guarantees of internal self-determination of peoples of 
may not be valid after all. 
 
The UN General Assembly in Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960113 
confirmed the significance of the self-determination of peoples norm under 
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modern international law. The declaration’s preamble114 sets out the following 
principles:   
 
o The need to remove all impediments to freedom as a means of abating 
serious threats to world peace.  
o The need to promote social progress and better standards of life and larger 
freedom; 
o The need for the creation of conditions of stability and well-being and 
peaceful and friendly relations based on respect for the principles of equal 
rights and self-determination of all peoples; and  
o The need for universal respect for, and observance of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all.  
 
Paragraph 6 of the Declaration states that: “Any attempt aimed at the partial 
or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a 
country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations”. 
 
The Declaration concludes with the clarion call upon all States to:  
 
Observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the 
UN, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the present 
Declaration on the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal 
affairs of all States, and respect for the sovereign rights of all 
peoples and their territorial integrity.115  
 
Thus, it is incontestable that the right to self-determination is critical to 
international law’s imagination on how to ensure stability, peace and security. 
The Declaration makes reference to “sovereign rights of all peoples”. These 
rights must include the right of a population to remove a government which 
in its eyes has lost legitimacy to continue to govern over it – internal self-
determination, which is quite apart from external self-determination. The 
latter refers to the independence of a State to freely determine on matters of 
its external relations with other States without prior authorization of other 
States.  
 
On all of the occasions that the SADC has partially intervened (Zimbabwe 
2017 Operation Restore Legacy), or fully intervened, (Lesotho 1998, DRC 1998, 
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Asamoah, O., The Legal Significance Of The Declarations Of The General Assembly of The 
United Nations, 1966, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague; Higgins, R., The Development of 
International Law Through The Political Organs Of The UN, 1963, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
115 Ibid. 
 35 
Madagascar 2010); its major effect has not been to prevent an escalation of 
violence and disorder in the target State but to put down mass expressions of 
governmental illegitimacy absent the possibility of dismissing the same 
government by the ballot box for the national assembly.  
 
 
Normative Evolution of the Norm against Unconstitutional Takeover of 
power 
The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security was first launched in June 
1996 as a formal institution for ensuring and maintaining security and the rule 
of law in the sub- region.116 The Protocol establishing the Organ on Politics, 
Defence and Security in the SADC Region (1997)117 (the Treaty118) was signed 
and opened for ratification in 1977. On 14 August 2001, SADC Heads of State 
and Government signed in Blantyre, Malawi, a new Protocol on Politics, 
Defence and Security Cooperation, which provides an institutional 
framework by which Member States can coordinate policies and activities in 
the areas of politics, defence, and security; thereby formalising the SADC 
Organ first launched in 1996. Subsequently, the Strategic Indicative Plan for 
the Organ (SIPO) was signed in 2004, a view to operationalising the objectives 
set forth in the with Protocol done at Blantyre, Malawi on 14 August 2001  
 
SIPO appears to be a perfectly valid international treaty in that it satisfies the 
general and specific requirements for treaties outlined in the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969)119 (VCLT). International tribunals 
and national courts habitually rely on the material provisions of the VCLT to 
ascertain traditional rules on the law of treaties.120 Nonetheless, the legality of 
treaties in international law must be tested against the relevant and applicable 
provisions of the United Nations (UN) Charter.121  Moreover, in several of its 
provisions, the Organ itself makes it explicitly clear that it remains 
subservient to the UN Charter. Article 52(1) of the UN Charter authorises 
regional arrangements for the maintenance of international peace and security 
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but denies validity to treaty arrangements that undermine the ‘Purposes and 
Principles of the UN’.  
 
But for the intervention of the SADC the governments of target States would 
have collapsed. Whatever the SADC executive’s initial intentions, practice on 
the norm on the absolute prohibition of unconstitutional change of 
government shows that this norm has become a double-edged cutting sword 
that potentially could be applied to limit intra-State conflicts on the one hand 
and on the other, it can be cruelly used to deny oppressed populations the 
only possible means left for them to get rid of an oppressive government.  
 
The implementation of the SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security on 
22 September 1998 against Lesotho; and SADC attempts to invoke it against 
Zimbabwe’s perfectly constitutional Operation Restore Legacy (2017) shows 
that absent another robust countervailing SADC Organ for protecting citizens 
from national assembly electoral fraud of incumbent governments;  SIPO 
(2001) which operationalizes the Blantyre Protocol on Politics, Defence and 
Security Cooperation (2001) can frustrate democracy by perpetuating 
oppressive illegitimate governments. For Zimbabweans that would be 
unacceptable because it would effectively undo expression of their dignity 
summed up in their ancient constitutional convention of Chimurenga (Shona) 
or Inkululekho (Ndebele).  
 
Chimurenga/ Inkululekho is Zimbabwe’s foremost practised constitutional 
convention. It is evident in both their pre-colonial and post-colonial histories. 
It is what Operation Restore Legacy (2017) to stop the Mugabes from 
instituting a dynasty governance of Zimbabwe, and metaphorically intended 
“sexual transmission of leadership” was all about. Chimurenga/ Inkululekho 
opposes all the adverse effects of the SADC norm on the absolute prohibition 
of unconstitutional change of government. Zimbabweans themselves have 
executed Operation Restore Legacy (2017) in a peaceful medium that the 
intended operationalization of the SADC norm would have shattered. 
Moreover, Zimbabwean courts have ruled that Operation Restore Legacy 
(2017) did not breach any of the strictures of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
This raises the question whether the SADC norm on the absolute prohibition 
of unconstitutional change of government is at all needed by the peoples of 




Operation Restore Legacy (2017) and the emerging international 
constitutional order122 
 
Advocates of the demise of the State and the emergence of international 
institutions that have an equal if not stronger say in international ordering 
processes often exaggerate their claims by making replete assumptions from 
which they then cascade arguments for the proposition that state practice 
points to emergent international and regional value systems as processes for 
the re-organization and re-allocation of competencies among the pre-1945 
traditional subjects of international law and the post-1945 emergent subjects 
of the international legal system.123  
 
They argue, sometimes profusely and often hyperbolically that the 
Westphalia State based model of international order has declined so much 
that it has become unfeasible to describe international law through the action 
of States alone.124 They tend to invoke norms jus cogens – which refer to no 
more than a handful of norms in Public International Law,125 and to human 
rights processes that are firmly dependent on previous exhaustion of 
domestic/State remedies, as a basis for their claims of phenomenal 
transformation of the dynamic of international order. In part, Operation 
Restore Legacy (2017) appears to be a robust challenge of some of these 
exaggerations. It points to the resilience of ancient national conventions that 
contradict sub-regional and even regional constitutional frameworks that lack 
logical diligence to capture also UN aspirations for democratic rule and UN 
normative requirements on internal self-determination of peoples.126 By 
logical diligence I mean a norm’s inscription in its content and operational 
strategies, relevant other norms to maintain consistency in legal obligation 
and law’s integrity generally. By failing to accommodate cardinal principles 
of the UN and requirements of jus cogens in its normative framework, the 
SDAC norm on the absolute prohibition against unconstitutional takeover of 
power shows a very low logical diligence as no later norm of a lesser quality 
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could challenge the UN jus cogens on the right to self-determination. “Internal 
self-determination is the right of the people of a state to govern themselves 
without outside interference.”127 Consequently, “other states should not, 
through appeals or pressure, seek to prevent a people from freely selecting its 
own political, economic, and social system”.128 
 
By any measure, Zimbabwe’s foremost and enduring convention in social 
ordering is the core-value of Chimurenga/ Inkululekho or Resistance to oppression 
that its people are historically linked to and well known for.129 However, the 
core-constitutional value-set of the regional AU and sub-regional SADC 
includes the requirement to submit even to governments enthroned amid 
justifiable claims of electoral fraud. The AU’s Peace and Security Council 
(PSC)130 and the SADC’s Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Defence, 
Politics and Security131 which implements the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence 
and Security Cooperation ensure this. The AU website describes the PSC as “the 
standing organ of the AU for the prevention, management and resolution of 
conflicts (and as) … a key element of the African Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA), which is the umbrella term for the main AU 
mechanisms for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa”.  
 
The attempt by the Mugabes to institutionalise a dynasty rule of Zimbabwe in 
2017 resulted in a clash between the ancient national convention – 
Chimurenga/ Inkululekho/ Resistance to oppression and the SADC and AU norm 
on the absolute prohibition against unconstitutional takeover of power. 
Professor Philip Rosessler132 protests that by not intervening to halt Operation 
Restore Legacy (2017) the AU got it wrong.  
 
The African Union, in alignment with SADC, got it wrong and missed 
a valuable opportunity to strengthen and expand its anti-coup regime 
to include both de jure and de facto coups. In narrowly focusing on the 
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removal of the sitting head of state as the defining feature of a coup 
rather than the unconstitutional use of force to coerce elected leaders to 
relinquish power, it sets a dangerous precedent that threatens to 
undermine the strong gains the region has made to move beyond 
politics by the gun.133  
In his view, ancient national conventions that have support of UN cardinal 
International Bill of Human Rights norms and norms jus cogens count for 
nothing. While he correctly observes that the AU has for years turned “… a 
blind eye to President Mugabe’s subversion of democracy,” he maintains that: 
A sounder approach would have been for the AU’s Peace and Security 
Council to condemn the de facto coup - as it would a de jure coup - and 
threaten to suspend Zimbabwe from the African Union until the 
military released Mugabe from house arrest, handed over power to a 
transitional post-Mugabe government, and returned to the barracks. 
Such a policy response would have delivered a similar outcome as 
what transpired - ridding Zimbabwe and the AU of the Mugabe 
problem - while strengthening, rather than weakening, the region's 
anti-coup norm. Instead, the AU endorsed a factional coup by the 
Zimbabwe military and its former vice president, Mnangagwa, that 
now sees the coup perpetrators in key positions in the post-Mugabe 
government in direct contravention of the African Charter on 
Democracy, Elections and Governance.134 
Clearly, Operation Restore Legacy (2017) had to climb behind the steep 
protections of both the AU and SADC regime protectionist values in order to 
ensure a stop to the contrived Mugabe dynasty rule of Zimbabwe. This 
manifests a tension between the national core-value of Chimurenga/ Inkululekho/ 
Resistance to oppression on the one hand, and on the other, the sub-regional and 
the regional protectionist value sets, that champion the sanctity of de facto 
governments, whatever their disposition even over the matter of one of the 
UN’s most cherished goal of democratic governance under Article 25 ICCPR 
(1966) even though both the SADC and the AU profess to but miserably fail to 
insist on democratic governance among their member States parties.  
 
The success of Operation Restore Legacy (2017) is underlined by the 
following: 
 
1) A stop to the Mugabe contrived dynasty rule of Zimbabwe. 
2) A successful circumvention of both SADC and AU de facto 
government protectionist mechanisms. 




3) Achievement of the popular will of Zimbabweans adverse AU and 
SADC mechanisms. 
4) Manifest national peace and security greater than that immediately 
preceding the operation.    
 
This tentatively recommends the view that national conventions potentially 
can penetrate and bust sub-regional and regional value systems that have the 
potential to subvert cardinal principles and aspirations of International Law, 
including the right to democratic governance promoted by International 
Human Rights Law for the purpose of promoting and ensuring international 




Zimbabwe’s Operation Restore Legacy (2017) has exposed fundamental flaws 
in the constitutional values of the SADC. These pertain to the SADC norm on 
the absolute prohibition against unconstitutional takeover of power. 
Particularly where sub-regional or regional institutions’ normative structures 
have not developed diligently enough to inscribe in their constitutive 
formulations and operational mechanisms the cardinal requirements of UN 
law, the UN Security Council has a close monitoring responsibility to ensure 
that the peace and security competencies delegated to regional institutions 
and agencies are not applied inconsistently to local general constitutional 
principles enshrined in enduring ancient national conventions of Member States 
parties that have full backing of UN human rights standards. Chimurenga/ 
Inkululekho/ Resistance of oppression is an example of such principles. This has 
been justified in the foregoing discussion.  
 
Firstly, the recognition under Public International Law of general principles of 
law recognised by members of the relevant community is a mainstay of the 
sources of International Law under Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ 
(1945). Secondly, any failure of the UN Security Council to ensure this will 
likely result in grave breaches of international peace and security because 
citizens will not stand by while unpopular or illegitimate leaders seek to 
remain in authority by invoking rules of leaders’ survival organizations such as 
the SADC. Citizens will, as Operation Restore Legacy (2017) has shown reject 
the application of any such rules to their affairs by actively challenging them 
and by insisting on application of their local ancient and enduring 
conventional norms such as Chimurenga/ Inkululekho/ Resistance of oppression. 
 
The ICJ clarified in the Asylum case that where a party seeks to rely on a 
regional norm qua customary international law, it must show that the other 
party had actually consented to be bound by that norm and not merely 
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acquiesced to it. By invoking the ancient Zimbabwean constitutional norm - 
Chimurenga/ Inkululekho/ Resistance of oppression against the SADC norm on the 
absolute prohibition of unconstitutional change of power, Zimbabweans have 
demonstrated that they want nothing to do with SADC norms and practices 
that are indifferent to UN requirements on good governance and International 
Law’s requirements on democratic governance. Zimbabweans may have very 
well struck the first body blow to the SADC’s decrepit value system. 
 
There are several lessons for the UN, the AU and the SADC to draw from 
Operation Restore Legacy (2017). For the UN, the hyperbole about the decline 
of the significance of the State in the normative arrangements for peace and 
security often rehearsed in the literature on constitutionalism is questionable. 
Ancient national conventions of constitutional significance can still, as 
Operation Restore Legacy (2017) has shown, prevail over sub-regional and 
regional institutions unless the latter have been diligently established and their 
implementation mechanisms synchronised consistently with the aspirations 
of both the UN and local populations’ constitutional values.  
 
Membership of the SADC does not necessarily dispense with ancient 
fundamental conventions of States parties. On the contrary, the SADC would 
enhance its legitimacy by developing operational standards and mechanisms 
for the implementation of Article 5 goals of the SADC Treaty by drawing 
extensively on the commonest ancient and enduring conventions of member 
States parties. The conflict between the SADC norm on the absolute 
prohibition of unconstitutional takeover of power and Zimbabwe’s ancient 
and enduring constitutional convention Chimurenga/ Inkululekho/ Resistance of 
oppression was resolved in Operation Restore Freedom (2017) in favour of the 
latter, thereby casting enormous doubt on the legitimacy of the SADC’s value 
system. 
 
If the SADC prioritised the promotion and ensuring of good governance in 
the sub-region, that could wipe out all the costs associated with 
implementation of the norm on the absolute prohibition of unconstitutional 
takeover of power in defence of unpopular or illegitimate leadership. 
Additionally, if it chose to promote good governance, that would serve to 
enhance economic performance of Member States parties by building 
confidence of foreign investors for example. Similar benefits could accrue to 
the AU if it prioritised good governance over the protection of unpopular or 
illegitimate leaders through operationalization of some of its Peace and 
Security Council initiatives. 
 
International support and acquiescence with Operation Restore Legacy (2017) 
appears to have stemmed from a recognition of the SADC’s democratic 
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deficit. Absent a practice of genuine democratic governance among SADC 
Member States parties, third States will generally find it difficult to condemn 
events like Operation Restore Legacy (2017). Therefore, the SADC needs 
urgently to promote and ensure democratic governance among Member 
States parties by establishing a parallel constitutional normative structure of 
equal weight to the one on the absolute prohibition of unconstitutional 
takeover of power in order to ensure the absolute sanctity of the national 
assembly ballot. As a precondition to the continued operation and 
enforcement of the norm on the absolute prohibition of unconstitutional 
change of government, the new norm must have also a similar if not stronger 
monitoring and enforcement mechanism than the former.    
 
 
This is because implementation of the SADC norm on the absolute prohibition 
of unconstitutional takeover of power presupposes that citizens of the target 
State have a realistic possibility to remove the unpopular or illegitimate 
leadership via national assembly ballots. However, conducting free and fair 
democratic elections is still a big challenge for most African States, including 
those of the SADC.  Zimbabwe itself has not even ratified the regional African 
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance adopted by the AU on 30 
January 2007. To be certain, Zimbabwe has not even signed the thing. 
 
Therefore, without the guarantee that SADC populations have realistic 
opportunities periodically to choose who governs over them as required 
under Article 25 of the ICCPR (1966), the norm on the absolute prohibition of 
unconstitutional takeover of power is nonsense on stilts. Insisting upon this 
norm in the absence of such a guarantee makes the SADC a surrogate for all 
unpopular or illegitimate regimes in the sub-region. It can be applied to 
protect unpopular or illegitimate leaders from “other means” of removal from 
office while the national assembly ballot remains an unlikely avenue for 
citizens to replace such leadership.  
 
The SADC’s reserved and cautious approach to monitoring by international 
human rights treaty bodies is further reason why the norm on the absolute 
prohibition of unconstitutional takeover of power needs to be 
counterbalanced by another on the absolute sanctity of national assembly 
ballots. It is unconscionable that a sub-regional organization comprised of 
States with such a terrible attitude to ensuring protection of individuals’ 
human rights should guarantee political leaders protection from ‘other’ 
means of removal from power when in many cases national assembly ballots 
offer no realistic possibilities whatsoever to change leadership. 
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Operation Restore Legacy (2017) could be characterised also as a warning to 
SADC, AU and the new Zimbabwe administration of what to expect from this 
unique people comprised of several tribes that are bound by the same 
common trait which truly makes them one. In fact throughout Operation 
Restore Legacy (2017) Zimbabweans forgot any other inclination of personal 
identity and immersed themselves in Chimurenga/ Inkululekho/ Resistence to 
oppression – the struggle that had to be accomplished. Against SADC and AU 
manoeuvrings, Zimbabweans prevailed, and will prevail again, and again if 
so required. Chimurenga/ Inkululekho is the only way they know how to 
proceed against oppression.  
 
SADC values on the protection of de facto regimes must change to end 
potential conflict with enduring and not for change ancient national conventions 
that seek to promote and uphold cardinal principles of the UN for ensuring 
international peace and security by advocating and advancing good 
governance and promoting International Human Rights Law.  
 
 
